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Leverage is the use of debt. Leverage is a 
tool used to find the proportion of a 
company's assets financed by debt and 
compared with equity (Weston & Copeland, 
1992). Financial leverage is caused by the 
manager's policy when determining the 
source of financing originating from outside 
the company, especially financing from debt. 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) stated that companies 
in China, funding sources of 20% came from 
banks and 80% came from other sources 
such as retained earnings, informal funding, 
family loans, trade credit, investment 
financing and equity. Chen (2004) suggests 
that determinants of leverage such as 
company size, profitability, growth 
opportunities and physical assets are also 
relevant in China. 
Capital structure can be influenced by 
various factors, one of which is the type of 
ownership structure. Government ownership 
is often associated with high levels of 
leverage. This is because SOEs borrow 
more often than issuing shares (Dewenter & 
Malatesta, 2001). SOEs also have loan 
guarantees that allow them to borrow at 
favorable prices. In companies in China, 
government ownership actually has a 
negative relationship to leverage. 
Companies with high government ownership 
tend to avoid financing from debt. Even if 
there is, the use of debt to companies with 
this type of ownership is not too strong 
(Chan et al., 2013). 
When SOEs become controlling 
shareholders, they tend to explore the 
resources of their subsidiaries (Bradford et 
al., 2013). The controlling shareholders tend 
to support listed companies by providing 
credit guarantees and capital injections to 
maintain company funding and the feasibility 
of refinancing (Ying & Wang, 2013). 
Meanwhile, when SOEs become the 
majority shareholders, they tend to use their 
subsidiaries to increase capital from the 
capital market which then makes the capital 
available for internal funding. 
If government is not a major shareholder 
in a company, the government can’t interfere 
too much with company affairs. This is 
because the proportion of shares owned is 
small, so it lacks the power to regulate the 
company. Sometimes the government itself 
deliberately reduces the proportion of its 
ownership so that they do not interfere too 
much and submit it to market mechanisms, 
especially to private-owned companies. In 
this study, non-government ownership will 
use the proportion of shares owned by the 
management of the company or more often 
called managerial ownership. 
Corporate funding decisions are very 
dependent on the goals, desires, and 
perceptions of their managers (Zwiebel, 
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1996). Managers focus on capital structures 
to ensure sufficient efficiency and prevent 
challenges to control. Managers limit the use 
of debt and are committed to improving 
operations to increase revenue (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977). On the other hand, Berger & 
Humphrey (1997) argue that managers will 
increase debt when managerial security is 
threatened by the possibility of failure in an 
accidental CEO bidding or replacement. 
Another variable that is thought to also 
influence leverage is credit rating. Credit 
rating is an assessment of the credit risk of 
each individual, company and country. 
Credit rating can be calculated by looking at 
financial history, assets owned and 
liabilities. Credit rating gives an overview to 
creditors or investors to the level of 
possibility of the subject, whether it is 
individuals, companies or countries in 
paying their debts. Credit ratings measure 
credit worthiness and the ability to repay 
debts that affect the interest rate of the debt.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Government ownership  
 
Government ownership increases the cost of 
debt (Abramov et al., 2017). This is related 
to fulfilling the investment targets in the 
social and political aspects, so have an 
impact on the decline in the performance 
and value of the company. This causes a 
decrease in profitability and an increase in 
debt costs that are at high risk of default 
(Borisova et al., 2012). Companies with this 
type of ownership tend to have a high level 
of debt. 
Companies operating in developing 
countries tend to have a greater degree of 
leverage than developed countries. This is 
because in developing countries, the 
management of the company has not been 
implemented optimally so that the 
company's performance is also not optimal 
Huang et al., (2018) and Bhabra et al., 
(2008) suggest that government ownership 
has a positive effect on leverage. The role of 
the Chinese government in corporate 
funding decisions is very important, given its 
dual role as the largest shareholder of SOEs 
and owners of all major banks. The Chinese 
government tends to put pressure on banks 
to provide loans, especially to SOEs, this is 
what causes state-owned companies in 
China to have easy access to debt (Li et al., 
2009). Based on the description, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
H1: Government ownership has a 
positive effect on leverage 
 
Managerial ownership  
 
Companies with a majority of managerial 
ownership tend to optimize the use of 
income compared to using debt in financing 
their operations. The use of debt can reduce 
manager's freedom and high risk of default. 
If the debt experiences default, it will further 
increase the cost of bankruptcy. In the 
context of companies in Pakistan, company 
management will limit debt to reduce 
bankruptcy risks and costs (Hasan & Butt, 
2009). This is in line with the results of 
Brailsfordet al. (2002) who found that when 
managerial ownership is low it causes 
agency conflict rates to be low, which 
impacts on higher levels of debt. In addition, 
when companies use debt, supervision of 
the performance of managers in managing 
management will increase. This is in 
accordance with the opinion of Huang & 
Song (2006) who stated that when 
managerial ownership increases, it will also 
increase behavior to anticipate risk, which 
leads to a decrease in the level of debt. 
Another supporting literature is research 
conducted by Wahba (2014) who argues 
that managerial ownership is negatively 
related to the capital structure of companies 
registered in Egypt. Based on the 
description mentioned, the hypothesis can 
be formulated as follows: 
 
H2: Managerial ownership has a negative 
effect on leverage 
 
Credit rating on government 
ownership and leverage 
 
Companies with a majority of shares owned 
by the government have great access to 
external funding (Huang et al., 2016). The 
government as the majority shareholder has 
an important role in making funding 
decisions and has great access to getting 
loans, especially from banks. In addition, the 
government's good reputation in the market 
can also be taken into consideration for 
investors to invest in a company. In addition 
to the company's reputation, another thing 
that is considered by creditors is the 
protection of their rights. The better the 
 
 





protection of creditors, the more likely it is to 
increase public debt (Gu et al., 2018) 
One company's reputation can be 
assessed from its credit rating. Credit rating 
is a rating that shows the company's ability 
to fulfill its obligations. Credit ratings can 
influence corporate funding decisions, this is 
consistent with the results of research by 
Krichene & Khoufi (2016). Companies with 
high ratings can mean that the company is 
more financially stable so that it has the 
ability to pay its obligations. From this 
explanation it can be concluded that the 
credit rating also affects the company's 
leverage decisions, so the hypothesis can 
be formulated as follows: 
 
H3: Credit rating moderates the 
relationship between government 
ownership and leverage 
 
Credit rating on managerial ownership 
and leverage 
 
Managers in companies with high levels of 
debt will be at higher risk than owners (Vo & 
Nguyen, 2014). This is because if the debt 
level is high, managers are considered to be 
unable to manage the company's 
management optimally, increasing the 
likelihood of managers losing their jobs. This 
causes the manager to limit the use of debt 
to the company, thus minimizing the risks it 
faces. High managerial ownership also plays 
a role in balancing the interests of corporate 
management with shareholders which leads 
to a reduction in debt costs (Sun et al., 
2015). 
One of the factors that influence funding 
decisions is credit rating. Changes in credit 
rating will influence funding decision making 
(Krichene & Khoufi, 2016). The change in 
credit rating has a significant effect on 
leverage the following year. Companies 
whose ratings go down will reduce debt the 
following year to regain investment levels. 
Based on the description, the hypothesis 
can be written as follows: 
 
H4: Credit rating moderates the 
relationship between managerial 
ownership and leverage 
 




The dependent variable is a variable that is 
influenced by other variables. The 
dependent variable in this study is company 
leverage as measured by Debt to Assets 
Ratio (DAR). Debt to Assets Ratio is a ratio 
that shows how much the company's assets 























Independent variables are variables that 
can affect other variables. Independent 
variables used in this study is government 
and managerial ownership. Government 
ownership is measured by the 
standardization value of the percentage of 
share ownership held by the government in 
the company, which can be seen from the 
annual report of each company. Managerial 
ownership is measured by the standardized 
value of the percentage of share ownership 
held by the company management, which 
can be seen from the annual report of each 
company. 
 
𝑍𝐺𝑂𝑉 = {(𝐺𝑂𝑉 − 𝐺𝑂𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )/𝜎𝐺𝑂𝑉} 
𝑍𝑀𝐴𝑁 = {(𝑀𝐴𝑁 − 𝑀𝐴𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)/𝜎𝑀𝐴𝑁} 
 
The moderating variable is a variable that 
strengthens or weakens the relationship 
between the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. The moderating 
variable used in this study is credit rating. 
Credit rating is an assessment of a 
company's ability to fulfill its obligations. To 
use credit rating as moderation, researchers 
use an ordinal scale to represent the rating 
at each level. For the idAAA rating is given a 
value of 7, and the lower the value the 
smaller it becomes until the idCCC is given 
a value of 1, then the rating value is 
standardized. In this study using a credit 
rating issued by PEFINDO. 
This research used a multiple regression 
analysis test with the assumption of ordinary 
least square (OLS) and test of absolute 
difference value method. 
 
 
Population and sampling  
 
The population in this study was a company 
rated by PEFINDO and listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 
period 2015 - 2017. The sample used was a 
company that was rated by PEFINDO during 
the 2015 to 2017 period and issued an 
annual report. 
 
Results and Discussion   
 
Descriptive statistics of leverage variable 
have a minimum value of 0.222X which is 
owned by Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk. 
(BSDE) in 2016, while the maximum value of 
0.940X is owned by Apexindo Pratama Duta 
Tbk. (APEX) in 2016. For the variable 
average (mean) the leverage is 0.569X and 




Descriptive statistics of government 
ownership variable show that the minimum 
value of -0.564X is owned by companies that 
do not have a percentage of government 
ownership. The following company codes 
that do not have a government ownership 
percentage include: JPFA, GJTL SMSM, 
TAXI, WEHA, AKRA, LTLS, WTON, ICBP, 
MYOR, ROTI, STTP, AISA, GDST, BMTR, 
ANTM (2017), TINS (2017) , MEDC, APEX, 
RUIS, BWPT, SIMP, APLN, ELTY, BSDE, 
DART, DILD, MDLN, PPRO (2015), SMRA 
(2016 and 2017), SSIA, FAST, MPPA, 
TELE, MYRX, FISH, INTA, TGKA and 
PANPR. Meanwhile, the maximum value is 
2,611X owned by Kimia Farma (Persero) 
Tbk. in 2015-2017. For the mean value of -
0.0197X and the standard deviation of 
0.978X. 
Descriptive statistics of managerial 
ownership variables show that the minimum 
value of -0.403X is owned by companies that 
do not have a percentage of managerial 
ownership. The following code of companies 
that do not have managerial ownership 
include: JPFA, TAXI, WEHA (2016 and 
2017), AKRA (2015 and 2017), LTLS (2016), 
ADHI, WSKT (2015 and 2016), WIKA, 
WTON, ICBP, MYOR (2015), ROTI, AISA, 
ANTM, TINS, MEDC, PGAS, APEX, RUIS, 
INAF, BWPT, SIMP, ELTY, BSDE, DART 
Table 1. 
Ordinal Scale for Rating Levels 
 


















(2015), DILD (2015 and 2016), PPRO, 
PJAA, FAST, MPPA, ISAT, TELE, SSMR 
(2017), FISH, ITA (2016 and 2017), TGKA, 
PANPR (2015 and 2016). Meanwhile, the 
maximum value of 5.332X is owned by 
Gunawan Dianjaya Steel Tbk. in 2015. For 
the mean value of 0.242X and the standard 
deviation of 1.025X. 
Descriptive statistics for credit rating 
variables show that the minimum value of -
2,500X is owned by companies with an 
idCCC rating, namely Bakrieland 
Development Tbk. in 2015-2017. 
Meanwhile, the maximum value for the credit 
rating variable which is equal to 1.759X is 
owned by a company with an idAAA rating. 
The following codes of companies with an 
idAAA rating include: APEX (2015 and 
2016), SMRA (2017), ISAT, TLKM, and 
JSMR (2015 and 2016). For the average 
value (mean) that is equal to 0.695X and the 
standard deviation is 0.944X. 
Descriptive statistics of the interaction 
variable between government ownership 
and credit rating show that the minimum 
value of 0.38X is owned by Jasa Marga 
(JSMR) in 2015 and 2016, while the 
maximum value of 2.02X is owned by 
Indofarma Tbk. (INAF) in 2015 and 2016. 
For the average value of this variable is 
0.9555X and the standard deviation is 
0.394X. 
Descriptive statistics of the interaction 
variable between managerial ownership and 
credit rating show that the minimum value of 
0.16X is owned by Mayora Indah Tbk. 
(MYOR) in 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile, the 
maximum value of 2.39X is owned by 
Gunawan Dianjaya Steel Tbk. (GDST) in 
2015. For the mean value of this variable is 




Determination coefficient test (R2) 
 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of 
determination (adjusted R2) in model 1 of 
the independent variable can affect the 
dependent variable by 34%, while 66% of 
leverage is influenced by other variables 
outside the research model. In model 2 the 
independent variable can affect 7,1%, while 
92,9% of leverage is influenced by other 
variables.  
 
Simultaneous significance test (F-Test) 
 
In Table 4 presents significance values for 
each regression model of 0,000 and 0,005. 
From these results, it can be concluded that 
all variables of the two regression models 
jointly influence the dependent variable 
namely leverage. 
The test results for the first hypothesis 
show that government ownership has no 
effect on leverage. In the study of Huang et 
al. (2018) stated that government ownership 
has no influence on leverage, when the 
government is not the majority shareholder. 
The value of the probability of government 
ownership that is not significant shows that 
government ownership is a less meaningful 
explanation for leverage. This is because the 
number of research samples that have little 
government ownership cannot significantly 
influence leverage. Based on the description 
above, it is concluded that the first 
hypothesis is rejected. 
The results of testing the second 
hypothesis show that managerial ownership 
negatively affects leverage, according to the 
results of Vo & Nguyen (2014). The negative 
influence between managerial ownership 
and leverage shows the opposite 
relationship Huang & Song (2006) state that 
when managerial ownership increases, it will 




 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LEVERAGE 150 0,222 0,940 0,56942 0,157442 
GOV 150 -0,564 2,611 -0,01977 0,978236 
MAN 150 -0,403 5,332 0,02419 1,024693 
CR 150 -2,500 1,759 0,06954 0,943529 
SQRTSNM1 150 0,38 2,02 0,9555 0,39427 
SQRTSNM2 150 0,16 2,39 0,8979 0,45279 
Valid N (listwise)      











leading to a decrease in debt. Significant 
managerial ownership values indicate that 
managerial ownership is an explanatory 
meaning for leverage. Based on the 
description above, it is concluded that the 
second hypothesis is accepted. 
The results of testing the third hypothesis 
show that the credit rating does not 
moderate the relationship between 
government ownership of leverage. The 
results of these tests contradict the results of 
research by Krichene & Khoufi (2016). The 
negative coefficient between the interaction 
variables of government ownership and the 
credit rating on leverage shows a 
relationship that weakens the relationship 
between government ownership of leverage. 
The probability value of the SQRTSNM1 
variable that is not significant shows that the 
interaction variables of government 
ownership and credit rating are explanatory 
which are less meaningful for leverage. So, 
it can be concluded that the credit rating 
variable does not moderate the relationship 
between government ownership of leverage, 
so the third hypothesis is rejected. 
The results of testing the fourth 
hypothesis show that the credit rating 
moderates the relationship between 
managerial ownership of leverage, this is in 
accordance with the results of research by 
Sun et al., (2015). The positive coefficient 
between the SQRTSNM2 variable on 
leverage shows a relationship that 
strengthens the relationship between 
managerial ownership of leverage. The 
significant probability value of the 
SQRTSNM2 variable indicates that the 
managerial ownership interaction variable 
and credit rating are explanatory meaning 
for leverage. Based on the description 
 
Table 3. 
Determination Coefficient Test 
 
Regression Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
Model 1 0,595 0,354 0,340 0,127868 
Model 2 0,309 0,096 0,071 0,151765 





Regression Model F Sig. 
Model 1 26,631 0,000 
Model 2 3,839 0,005 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,564 ,010  53,872 ,000 
GOV ,009 ,011 ,057 ,849 ,397 
MAN  -,038 ,010 -,250 -3,755 ,000 
CR 0,91 ,011 ,545 8,181 ,000 
2 (Constant) ,528 ,038  13,755 ,000 
GOV ,016 ,015 ,098 1,074 ,285 
MAN -,056 ,015 -,367 -3,657 ,000 
SQRTSNM1 -,038 ,042 -,095 -,901 ,369 
SQRTSNM2 ,089 ,036 ,255 2,439 ,016 
 a. Dependent Variable: Firm Performance  









above, it is concluded that the fourth 
hypothesis is accepted. 
 
CONCLUSION   
 
Ownership structure can affect leverage. In 
the first hypothesis the variables of 
government ownership are used as 
independent variables. From the test results 
it was found that government ownership did 
not affect leverage. This is because the 
amount of government ownership in the data 
that is examined is too little so that it does 
not have a significant effect on leverage. 
Managerial ownership variables are used as 
independent variables. From the test results 
it was found that managerial ownership 
negatively affected leverage. 
Another factor that can affect leverage is 
credit rating. In the third hypothesis the credit 
rating does not moderate the relationship 
between government ownership of leverage. 
However, in the fourth hypothesis the credit 
rating moderates the relationship between 
managerial ownership of leverage. 
Our research has limitations. The sample 
used is limited because the number of 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange and rated by PEFINDO for the 
period 2015 to 2017 is only 53 companies. 
With the limitations above, improvements 
are needed for future research. Therefore, 
suggestions that can be given are data need 
to be adjusted and manipulated before 
testing and testing can be equipped with 
other methods, so that the most appropriate 
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